	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

RESTORING FOIA’S REACH TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Andrew S. Yingling*

A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.1
Many may wonder who is at the center of decisions to kill U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals in drone strikes in the war on terror. A legal clinic2 affiliated
with CUNY School of Law recently submitted a Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) request to the National Security Council (“NSC”) seeking this precise information.3 In a startling example of national secrecy and evasion of
accountability, the government asserted that “records”4 of “U.S. officials debating whether to kill people, including U.S. citizens, outside of recognized battlefields and without judicial process, are categorically immune from the
[FOIA].”5 The government argued further that the President of the United
States has the unrestricted authority to destroy any such records.6 In denying
the clinic’s request, District Court Judge Vitaliano relied specifically on the
1996 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case, Armstrong v. Executive Office of the
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Policy, Volume 23. J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law; B.A., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2011. I would sincerely like to thank
William Walsh for his expert advice and guidance for this Comment, as well as the Journal staff
for their thoughtful edits. Additionally, I would like to thank my aunt, Monique Yingling, for her
constant love and support every step of the way.
1

Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822).
Main Street Legal Services, Inc. is a non-profit law firm within the City University of
New York School of Law, located at 2 Court Square in Queens, New York. Complaint for
Injunctive Relief at 1, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948,
2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013).
3
Id. at 2. Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to Defendant dated November 27, 2012
that requested . . . all records related to the killing of U.S. citizens and foreign nationals by
drone strike . . . all NSC meeting minutes taken in the year 2011. In a letter dated December
14, 2012, but postmarked January 18, 2013, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s FOIA request by simply asserting that the NSC was not subject to the FOIA and withheld the requested records. Id. at 2-3.
4
5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “record” as “any information that would be
an agency record subject to the requirements of this section when maintained by an agency
in any format, including an electronic format”).
5
Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Forum: The NSC, Drone Killing Accountability and
New FOIA Litigation, JURIST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/08/cox-kassemNSC-accountability.php####.
6
Id.; see also Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim at 4, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948,
2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013) (arguing that the NSC is not subject to the
FOIA).
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President.7 Armstrong barred citizen access to documents generated by the
NSC on the ground that the NSC is not an agency subject to the FOIA.8 In
1997, the Supreme Court denied Armstrong’s petition for certiorari,9 in what
appeared to be the end of this debate until now. Armstrong is finally being
challenged outside the D.C. Circuit after two decades of wars involving an institutionalized use of unmanned drones 10 and a radical transformation in U.S.
national security policy.11
Under the rationale of Armstrong, substantial numbers of potentially significant documents surrounding the activities of the NSC may never be exposed.12
This is particularly troubling because the NSC is likely to expand its use of
unmanned drones for extrajudicial killings.13 Moreover, by some estimates, the
number of militants and civilians killed in the on-going drone campaign over
the past decade will soon surpass 3,000, exceeding the number of people killed
by al-Qaeda in the September 11 terrorist attacks.14 Currently, the government
categorizes NSC records pursuant to the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”).15
This classification undercuts the public’s capability to evaluate and hold responsible government officials for policies such as the extrajudicial killing of
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Main St. Legal Servs. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712, at
*3–7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013). As the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
observed, “Current events have changed little, except perhaps to heighten the American
government’s concern over (and awareness of) threats to national security interests.” Id. at
*3. Concluding, the district court said, “The Court finds no reason to depart from Armstrong’s thoroughly persuasive and well-articulated reasoning.” Id. at *7.
8
Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
9
Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997).
10 See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v.
Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013).
11 Melvyn P. Leffler, 9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy, 79 No.
5 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1045, 1046 (2003).
12 R. Kevin Bailey, Note, “Did I Miss Anything?”: Excising the National Security
Council from FOIA Coverage, 46 DUKE L.J. 1475, 1478 (1997).
13 Lesley Clark & Jonathan S. Landay, Obama Speech Suggests Possible Expansion of
Drone
Killings,
MCCLATCHYDC
(May
23,
2013),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/23/192081/obama-promises-anew-to-transfer.html;
see also Greg Miller, Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding
Names
to
Kill
Lists,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
23,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signalsus-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c39408fbe6a4b_story_3.html.
14 Miller, supra note 13.
15 Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off the Record: The National Security Council,
Drone Killings & Historical Accountability, 31 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2014), available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2283243http://ssrn.com/abstract=2283243http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2283243.

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
U.S. citizens and citizens of other nations with unmanned drones.16 It hinders
government officials in determining whether to continue the program and also
hinders congressional decision-making.17 Further, it permits surreptitious
members of an administration to shift functions from an agency subject to
FOIA to the NSC, precluding transparency.18 Armstrong is inconsistent with
the fundamental purpose of the FOIA—“to ensure that the Government remains open and accessible to the American people and is always based not
upon the ‘need to know’ but upon the fundamental ‘right to know.’”19 As
President Obama stated, “The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails.”20 This
inclination towards disclosure should be applied to all decisions of the U.S.
government, including the decisions of the NSC.21
Despite the result in the district court, Main Street Legal Services is appealing to the Second Circuit.22 Considering the explosive expansion of NSC’s
mandate to conduct activities independent of the President,23 the Second Circuit should overrule Armstrong as outdated. If the Second Circuit disagrees
with the Armstrong ruling, then there will be a conflict in the circuits on a
pressing social issue, affecting all, which should necessitate intervention by the
Supreme Court.24
This Comment discusses the need for courts to revisit and overrule Armstrong; its analysis is outdated and should be reexamined in light of the everwidening activities of the NSC. The Comment begins by discussing the relevant information access laws and their impact on federal government entities’
status as agencies; Part II provides a historical overview of the NSC; Part III
explains the lengthy and complex legal controversy over the preservation and
disclosure of NSC records leading up to the decision in Armstrong; Part IV
critically dissects the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Armstrong; Part V argues the
	
  

	
  
16

Id.
Id.
18 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1489.
19 Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-175, § 2, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (2007); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
20 Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009).
21 Id.
22 Dasol Jung, CUNY Law Firm Seeks Drone Records, TICKER (Aug. 30, 2013),
http://ticker.baruchconnect.com/article/cuny-law-firm-seeks-drone-records/; see also Josh
Gerstein, Judge Rejects Bid to FOIA National Security Council, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2013,
4:16 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/08/judge-rejects-bid-to-foianational-security-council-170147.html.
23 Miller, supra note 13.
24 Josh Gerstein, Lawsuit Seeks to Restore FOIA Access to NSC Records, POLITICO
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.politico.com//blogs/under-the-radar/2013/08/lawsuit-seeks-torestore-foia-access-to-nsc-records-169944.html.
17
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D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Armstrong is outdated because the NSC’s role has
expanded in recent years to the point that the NSC exercises significant independent authority of the President; Part VI explains why the government’s arguments are insufficient, and in light of the NSC’s expansive authorities,
should be rejected. Finally, this Comment concludes that the NSC exercises
sufficient authority independent of the President to satisfy the requirements of
the FOIA definition of “agency.”
I. INFORMATION ACCESS LAWS
Before examining the ominous legacy of Armstrong, it is essential to distinguish the relevant information access statutes.25 The FOIA, discussed in greater
detail below, requires document production.26 The Federal Records Act
(“FRA”)27 is coextensive with the FOIA; documents covered by the FRA are
subject to direct production under FOIA.28 Before an agency can destroy a federal record, it must secure approval from the Archivist.29 On the other side of
the spectrum, the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (“PRA”)30 gives nearly unrestricted discretion to the President over documents created during his term of
office.31 The PRA also applies to Departments of the Executive Branch, because their duties have been held to be indistinct from those of the President.32
The President is permitted to restrict access to records regarding confidential
communications between the President and his advisors.33 In a political system
centered on accountability, it is essential to properly categorize documents; it

	
  

	
  
25 Note that prior to the “NSC’s March 25, 1994 declaration that it is not an agency, the
NSC’s recordkeeping guidelines distinguished between Federal and Presidential Records.”
Armstrong v. Bush, Exec. Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 698 (D.D.C. 1995).
26 5 U.S.C. § 552.
27 44 U.S.C. § 3106.
28 Armstrong, 877 F. Supp. at 698.
29 See 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (2006). The Archivist will disapprove of disposal if the
record has “sufficient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant continued
preservation.” Id. As the Armstrong court observed, “To dispose of a Federal Record, an
agency must first garner the approval of the Archivist . . . Consequently, documents that
qualify as a Federal Record are subject to specific guidelines and procedures in their management and disposal.” Armstrong, 877 F. Supp. at 698 (citations omitted).
30 Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (2006).
31 See MINORITY STAFF, COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUMMARY OF THE BUSH EXECUTIVE ORDER ON THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT 1 (2001),
available at http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/2004082710020864911.pdf.
32 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1479. One writer stated that the “Archivist is required to
release Presidential Records ‘as rapidly and completely as possible;’ however, the Archivist
also has the option to dispose of those Presidential Records which she determines ‘have
insufficient administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value.’” Id.
33 § 2204(a)(5).

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
averts needless government secrecy, and allows for a knowledgeable and informed electorate, which is necessary for a thriving democracy.34

	
  

	
  

A. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
The FOIA provides that any person has a right to obtain access to federal
agency records.35 The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he
basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed.”36 The Court further defined the FOIA
“as a means for citizens to know what their Government is up to.”37
“This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism.”38 That
phrase “defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.” 39 In a 2009
Presidential Memorandum addressing the FOIA, President Obama stated “a
democracy
requires
accountability,
and
accountability
requires
40
transparency.” The FOIA “encourages accountability through transparency.”41
The FOIA imposes a presumption in favor of disclosure on federal agencies, unless a record is specifically exempt from disclosure or the Act’s coverage.42 Section 552(a)(3) requires agencies to provide the requested records in

	
  
34 ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW
5 (2007). Authors Pallitto and Weaver observed:
Secrecy imposes tremendous costs on elective government; it is capable of destroying or
undermining the legal, political, and cultural traditions that undergird our political system.
The most obvious cost of secrecy is a reduction in executive accountability. To the extent
that the executive branch becomes impervious to observation, mechanisms designed to keep
presidents and their administrators honest become useless. Whatever remains secret ultimately need not be justified to anyone other than the President.
Id. The people’s right to know is considered vital to the health of our democracy, and openness benefits us all; therefore, it is essential that government take steps to preserve and keep
accessible the information that it has. See DAVID BANISAR, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 1, 9, 31 (2007).
35 What is FOIA?, FOIA.gov (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (“[FOIA] . . . is a law that gives
you the right to access information form the federal government. It is often described as the
law that keeps citizens in the know about their government.”). FOIA is codified at § 552.
See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
36 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
37 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38 Id. at 172.
39 Id.
40 Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
41 Id.
42 Id. (discussing the presumption in favor of disclosure); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(imposing certain limitations on FOIA’s disclosure obligations). Under § 552(b), documents
need not be disclosed if exempted for one of the following reasons:
1) classified as relating to national defense or foreign policy;
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the form or format requested if the records are “readily reproducible” in the
form or format.43 Each agency is required to “make reasonable efforts to search
for the records in electronic form or format,” unless those efforts would “significantly interfere” with the “automated information system” of the agency.44
Executive Branch agencies of the federal government, independent regulatory agencies, and some units in the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”)
are under the ambit of the FOIA.45 Subsection (f) of the FOIA defines the term
“agency” to include any “executive department . . . or other establishment in
the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the
President).”46 In the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, Congress indicated in the
legislative history that in using “Executive Office of the President,” Congress
intended the term not to mean the President’s immediate personal staff or units
in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President.47
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has developed a functional definition of
“agency” used to decide whether an EOP is subject to the FOIA;48 that is, offices in the Executive Office of the President that “wield[] substantial authority
independently of the President” are agencies subject to FOIA.49 To illustrate,
the Council on Environmental Quality is subject to FOIA, because of its inde	
  
2) related only to an internal personnel matter of an agency;
3) exempted specifically from disclosure by another act of Congress;
4) trade secrets, commercial, or financial information obtained from a privileged or
confidential source;
5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda not normally available to the public;
6) personnel or medical files;
7) certain information relating to law enforcement;
8) related to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
Id.
43 See § 552(a)(3)(B).
44 § 552(a)(3)(C); see also Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683
(Jan. 21, 2009) (“All agencies should use modern technology to inform citizens about what
is known and done by their Government.”).
45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 4 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide13/procedural-requirements.pdf#p4.
46 § 552(f)(1). The 1974 amendments to FOIA expanded the definition of “agency” to
include those entities that “perform governmental functions and control information of interest to the public.” H.R. REP. NO. 93–876, at 128 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 231
(1974).
47 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232.
48 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 4.
49 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Office of Admin., 566 F.3d 219,
222–23 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sweetland v. Walters,
60 F.3d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[I]n cases involving units of the Executive Office that
lacked substantial independent authority, we have consistently rejected the claim that they
were subject to FOIA.”).

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
pendent authority to “issue guidelines to federal agencies for the preparation of
environmental impact statements,” to “coordinate federal programs related to
environmental quality,” and to oversee certain activities of other federal agencies.50 Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget is a FOIA agency, as it
has a statutory duty to provide budget information to Congress.51 Similarly, the
Office of Science and Technology is subject to FOIA, despite its close proximity to the President, because it has independent authority to evaluate federal
scientific programs, to initiate and support research, and to award scholarships. 52 In contrast, the Council of Economic Advisers (“CEA”) is not an
“agency” under FOIA, because the CEA has no regulatory power and its function is limited to assisting and advising the President.53 The Office of the President, including the “President’s immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President,” also does
not constitute an agency under FOIA.54 Additionally, under this substantial
independent authority analysis, the following agencies were found not to be
subject to the FOIA: the Executive Residence Staff,55 the National Energy Policy Development Group,56 the Office of Counsel to the President,57 and the
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief.58
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Pac. Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir.

1980).
51

Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 901–02 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also U.S. DEP’T
supra note 45, at 4.
52 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073–76 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In fact, Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1976 with a broad mandate, identical
to that of the NSC, to advise and assist the President.
53 Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisors, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
54 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232; see also Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 4.
55 Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Sweetland, the D.C. Circuit observed that the Executive Residence Staff’s
functions demonstrate that it is exclusively dedicated to assisting the President in maintaining his home and carrying out his various ceremonial duties. The staff does not oversee and
coordinate federal programs . . . or promulgate binding regulations . . . In short, neither
Congress nor the President has delegated independent authority to [the Executive Residence
Staff].
Id.
56 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 412 F.3d 125, 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(concluding that the “NEPDG is not itself an ‘agency’ subject to the FOIA because its sole
function is to advise and assist the President”).
57 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at.5 & n.31 (citing Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Exec.
Office of the President, 688 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D.D.C. 1988)).
58 Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reasoning that the Presidential
Task Force on Regulatory Relief was exempt from FOIA, because its members functioned
as assistants to the President, although the Task Force was chaired by the Vice President and
composed of cabinet members).
OF JUSTICE,
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A recent FOIA development involved the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”).59 The ACLU filed
several FOIA requests inquiring into the targeted unmanned drone-killing program.60 After the court held in favor of the CIA, the ACLU appealed to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.61 In a noteworthy victory for transparency, the
D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court, concluding that, under the circumstances, the CIA’s Glomar response (neither confirm nor deny) was not justified.62 On remand to the district court, the CIA would be required to “explain
what records it is withholding, and on what grounds it is withholding them.”63

	
  

	
  

II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The NSC was created by The National Security Act of 1947.64 Under the
chairmanship of the President, with the Secretaries of State and Defense as its
key members, the NSC coordinates U.S. foreign policy and defense policy, and
reconciles U.S. diplomatic and military commitments and requirements.65 Beginning with the end of World War II, “each administration has sought to develop and perfect a reliable set of executive institutions to manage national
security policy.”66 The NSC has been at the heart of the “foreign policy coordi-
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See generally ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 425.
61 Id. at 426. More specifically, the court held that the CIA “was not required to confirm
or deny that it had any responsive records, let alone describe any specific documents it
might have or explain why any such documents were exempt from disclosure.” Id.
62 Id. at 425.
63 Press Release, ACLU, DC Appeals Court Rejects CIA’s Secrecy Claims in ACLU’s
Targeted Killing FOIA Lawsuit (Mar. 15, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 National Security Act of 1947 § 101, 50 U.S.C.A 3021 (West 2013). The statutory
mandate of the NSC is generally “to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security” and to perform
“such other functions as the President may direct.” National Security Act of 1947 § 101(a)–
(b), 50 U.S.C.A § 3021 (a)–(b) (West 2013). The NSC consists of “the President and certain
cabinet-level officials, including the National Security Adviser . . . The NSC staff, which
numbers about 150 persons, is headed by an Executive Secretary, who reports to the [National Security Adviser], and whom the President appoints without need of Senate confirmation.” Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 556.
65 § 3021(a) (There are distinctions between the NSC, the NSC staff, and the NSC system. The National Security Council is the formal, statutory body consisting of the President,
the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. The National
Security Council Staff consists of the National Security Advisor and the fifty or so area
and functional specialists who are appointed at the pleasure of the President and who are
charged with coordinating analysis, offering policy recommendations for the President,
and providing the staff work for formal council meetings. The NSC system includes both
the formal council and informal staff.).
66 Office of the Historian, U.S. Dep’t of State, History of the National Security Council
1947-1997, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 1997), https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm.
60

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
nation system, but it has changed many times” to best suit the needs of each
President.67
The NSC’s operation depends upon the dynamic relationship between the
President and his advisers and department heads.68 The National Security Act
envisioned an objective council, discrete from the White House, but overtime a
new, modern NSC developed.69 The modern NSC system differed from the old
one in three significant ways.70 First, the national security advisor shifted towards an influential political presidential advisor instead of the purely administrative executive secretary to the President’s council.71 Second, the national
security advisor’s influence increased the power and reach of the NSC staff.72
Finally, with the modern, more powerful NSC, the former NSC decreased its
role.73

	
  
	
  

III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE NSC AND THE FOIA LITIGATION THROUGH PRESENT DAY
The legal controversy over measures for the preservation of NSC records
has an extensive and complex history.74 In January 1989, the National Security
Archive (“Archive” or “NSA”)75 submitted several FOIA requests for material
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Id.
Id. (President Johnson relied on the National Security Advisor and his staff and various informal groups and trusted friends. President Nixon’s NSC was overwhelmingly influenced by his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, with whom he maintained a close
relationship. Kissinger nearly tripled the size of NSC staff, set up inter-departmental working groups to prepare NSC directives and became responsible for clearing policy cables.
Under Presidents Nixon and Ford, NSC staff focused on gaining information from other
departments, allowing the National Security Advisor to put before the President the best
possible range of options for decision. Carter believed that the role of the NSC was one of
policy coordination and that the NSC Adviser would be only one of many players in the
foreign policy process. The first President Bush incorporated his own foreign policy experience to the National Security Council, and restructured the NSC to include a Principals
Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees. The Clinton
administration fostered a collegial approach within the NSC on national security matters,
and further expanded NSC membership.).
69 AMY H. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, & NSC 76
(1999).
70 Id. at 85.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 86.
73 Id. at 87.
74 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir 1996).
75 The National Security Archive is a private non-profit organization that pursues disclosure of information relating to defense and national security policy. See About the National Security Archive: 25 Years of Opening Governments at Home and Abroad, NAT’L
SECURITY ARCHIVE, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/the_archive.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2014).
68
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stored on the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) and NSC electronic
communications systems from their creation in the mid-1980s to the date of
request.76 The Archive simultaneously filed suit for an injunction, arguing that
the electronic documents contained on the EOP and NSC electronic communications systems and back-up tapes were federal or presidential records, and
sought to prevent their destruction.77 The district court held that certain items
stored in the NSC’s computer system were records subject to the FRA, and that
the NSC’s guidelines relating to the records’ preservation were “arbitrary and
capricious.”78 When the government still had no guidelines for the records’
preservation, the district court held the government in contempt.79 On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit Court agreed that the NSC’s guidelines were inadequate, but
reversed the contempt citation.80 This issue was remanded for the district court
to determine whether the NSC properly distinguished between presidential and
federal records.81
President Clinton’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) then rendered an opinion reversing the position taken in 1978, “declaring the NSC is not an agency
subject to the FOIA and therefore does not have to comply with the FRA.”82
President Clinton adopted the OLC’s new position but instructed his then National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, that the NSC should voluntarily disclose “‘appropriate’ records, including those that had been ‘transferred by one
Administration to another for transition and continuity purposes.’”83 The Executive Secretary then asserted that all NSC documents are presidential records, exempt from both the FOIA and the FRA.84
Although the NSC had maintained an active FOIA program during the administrations of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush,85 the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Armstrong has, since 1996, effectively precluded any citizen from
	
  
76

Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Armstrong v. Exec Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
78 Id. at 556–57.
79 Id. at 557.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 6, Main St. Legal Servs.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013).
A month after the 1974 FOIA amendments, the NSC issued proposed FOIA regulations. See
Freedom of Information Fees, 40 Fed. Reg. 3612 (Jan. 23, 1975). A month later, the NSC
promulgated final FOIA regulations. See Freedom of Information Act Requests for Classified Documents—Processing, Fees, Reports, Applicable Material, Declassification Criteria,
Partial, Release, 40 Fed. Reg. 7316 (Feb. 19, 1975) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 2101 (2012)).
The NSC complied with the FOIA regulations under Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and
Bush and only declared itself exempt during the Armstrong case. See Armstrong, 90 F.3d at
567 (Tatel, Circuit J., dissenting).
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access to NSC generated documents. Current litigation is revisiting the question of whether courts outside the D.C. Circuit should adopt the holding in
Armstrong or reject it and require the NSC to be subject to the FOIA once
again.86 The on-going litigation, coupled with convincing evidence that the
NSC has expanded its role in recent years, strongly corroborates the notion that
the time has come for courts to restore FOIA access to NSC records, which
permits greater transparency, accountability, and a stronger democracy.
IV. THE NSC AND AGENCY STATUS UNDER THE
FOIA
In Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, the court held that the
NSC was not an agency under the FOIA,87 even though the NSC had admitted
to being an agency and the NSC had processed many FOIA claims as if it were
subject to FOIA.88 In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the test employed in Meyer v. Bush.89 The court believed that because the NSC had a
“firm structure” and its own staff and budget, the NSC did more than merely
advise and assist the President.90 The court also found that the NSC had an
elaborate and self-contained structure.91 Nevertheless, the court noted the NSC
had close proximity to the President, because the President chaired the NSC
and the National Security Adviser, who works closely with the President, controls the NSC staff.92
As to the third-prong of Meyer, the court noted that because the NSC was
proximate to the President, there would have to be a “strong showing” that the
NSC exercised “substantial authority, independent of the President.” 93 The
third-prong in the Meyer analysis looked to the nature of the authority dele-
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Gerstein, supra note 24.
Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 559, 567 (holding that although structure of National Security
Council is self-contained and proximate to the President, NSC staff exercise no substantial
authority either to make or to implement policy and, thus, NSC was not an “agency” subject
to disclosure requirements of Freedom of Information Act and therefore was not obligated
to preserve its records in accordance with Federal Records Act (FRA)).
88 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 706, 707 (D.D.C.
1995), rev’d, 90 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89 Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 558–59. To determine whether an agency exercises substantial
independent authority, the court will focus on:
the unit’s proximity to the President, “the nature of its delegation from the President,” and
“whether it has a self-contained structure.” [Courts] treat[] the three factors not as elements
to be weighed against each other as in a balancing test, but rather as keys to understanding
the nature of an [agency’s] functions in order to determine whether the unit exercises substantial independent authority apart from advising and assisting the President.
Id. at 568.
90 Id. at 559.
91 Id. at 560.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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gated to the NSC.94 The divided court concluded, however, that Armstrong
failed to carry his burden, as he did not show that the NSC exercises meaningful non-advisory authority.95 The Armstrong court reasoned that the NSC has
no authority from Congress.96 The NSC’s authority stemmed from Executive
Orders.97 Although the Executive Orders have given the NSC authority in diplomacy, non-proliferation, and telecommunications, the Armstrong court believed that the NSC did not have a substantive role in those matters that was
distinct from that of the President.98 Therefore, neither the President nor
Congress gave the NSC significant independent authority.99 Consequently, the
FOIA request failed.100
In deciding whether the Eastern District of New York should adopt Armstrong, as the government argued,101 it is important to understand the NSC’s
legal responsibilities and how it carries out those responsibilities. This understanding can only come from looking back two decades. Just months after the
Armstrong decision, for example, Congress established the NSC Committee on
Foreign Intelligence.102 Not only was this Committee created over the objection
of the President,103 it also gave the NSC authority that extends beyond advising
the President, such as reporting directly to an entity outside the NSC and the
White House.104
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN
LIGHT OF U.S. EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
In Armstrong, the D.C. Circuit evaluated a NSC that, despite exercising significant independent authority, was still developing. It follows that, for Armstrong to bind courts today, the NSC must continue to solely advise and assist
the President, as the court found in 1996. A finding that the NSC has expanded
its role beyond its 1996 capacity certainly calls into question the integrity of
Armstrong. Accepting this underlying premise, we must consider the U.S.
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Id.
Id. at 565.
96 Id. at 560.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 565.
99 Id. at 567.
100 Id. at 565.
101 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 23, Main St. Legal Servs.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013).
102 Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996 § 802, Pub. L. 104-293, 110 Stat.
3474, 3474 (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. § 3021(h) (West 2013)).
103 Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2039, 2039 (Oct. 11, 1996).
104 50 U.S.C.A § 3021(h)(5) (West 2013).
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emphasis on national security in the twenty-first century and how the NSC has
responded to this climate. The September 11, 2001 attacks, in many ways,
marked the beginning of a transformation in U.S. national security policy.
President George W. Bush declared a national emergency and indicated that
“we are facing a new and different type of enemy,” an enemy that he described
as “nameless,” “faceless,” and without “specific borders.”105 In response to the
9/11 attacks, the government has taken extensive measures to ensure our national security by strengthening airline security and securing U.S. borders.106
This emphasis on national security is evidenced by the enactment of the Homeland Security Act,107 the USA PATRIOT Act,108 and the current expansive role
of the National Security Agency in targeted killings.109 Similarly, the NSC’s
authority has expanded far beyond purely advising the President.110 Landmark
cases before the Supreme Court after 9/11 further demonstrate the emphasis on
national security. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld111 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla,112 the Court
addressed the President’s power to declare American citizens as “enemy combatants” and detain them indefinitely without trial.113 Then, in Rasul v. Bush114
and Boumediene v. Bush,115 the Court addressed the government’s power to
hold non-citizen enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without the
opportunity to challenge the basis of their detention in any court of the United
States.116
Changing the NSC system to meet novel U.S. national security needs has
been reasonably easy to do.117 The NSC staff routinely handles long-term planning as well as the more immediate business of national security.118 The National Security Act allowed major changes to be instituted without new legisla-
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Leonard Cutler, Enemy Combatants and Guantanamo: The Rule of Law and Law of
War of Post-9/11, 31 PEACE & CHANGE 35, 35 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMPLEMENTING 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 5, 22 (Progress Report 2011).
107 See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
108 See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272
(2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
109 Miller, supra note 13.
110 Cox & Kassem, supra note 5.
111 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
112 See generally Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
113 LEONARD CUTLER, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 9/11: THE SEPARATE ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, & THE
SUPREME COURT 1 (2008).
114 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
115 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
116 CUTLER, supra note 113, at 1.
117 ZEGART, supra note 69.
118 Id. at 77.
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tion, and executive orders, presidential directives, and other self-executing
commands have all been used to “create the national security adviser’s position; to alter fundamentally the NSC staff’s role, power, and jurisdiction; and
to downgrade the operation of the formal National Security Council.”119 In contrast to the pre-Kennedy system, the NSC developed to wield substantial power
and broad jurisdiction encompassing the full range of near, immediate, and
long-term affairs.120 Kennedy and his successors have allowed and even encouraged the NSC’s staff-dominance by expanding its jurisdiction and bolstering its capabilities.121 After Armstrong, 9/11, and two decades of war, the NSC
has further expanded its jurisdiction, developed its capabilities, and wielded
substantial and broad authority independent of the President.
Courts are recognizing that secrecy surrounding U.S. national security programs seriously undermines a meaningful and informed public debate on these
pressing issues, and our ability to evaluate and, when necessary, hold accountable the U.S. government.122 The litigation involving the ACLU and CIA highlights that this is the climate we are in: the time for transparency in these programs is now and the day has come to overturn Armstrong.

	
  

	
  

A. The Significance of Soucie v. David: The Sole Function Test
As previously mentioned, the 1974 FOIA amendments indicate the congressional intent behind the phrase “Executive Office of the President (“EOP”).”123
With regard to the meaning of EOP, Congress endorsed the holding reached in
Soucie v. David.124 The Soucie court found that if an entity’s “sole function
[was] to advise and assist the President” that would signal the entity “is part of
the President’s staff and not a separate agency.”125 In contrast, if an entity
wields “substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions,”
this would indicate agency status.126 When applying the Soucie Sole Function
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Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
122 PALLITTO & W EAVER, supra note 34, at 5–7.
123 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380 (1974).
124 Id. at 232. In Soucie v. David, citizens filed a lawsuit against the Director of the Office of Science and Technology for injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act
to compel the director to release certain documents. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that where the Office of Science and Technology had the independent function of evaluating
federal scientific programs, the office was an agency subject to the FOIA. Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that Office of Science and Technology was
an agency because it had independent function of evaluating federal scientific programs).
125 Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075.
126 Id. at 1073.
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test to the NSC, it is clear that the NSC is charged with substantial, broad, nonadvisory authority, and is therefore an agency for purposes of the FOIA.

	
  
	
  

	
  

B. The National Security Council Has Significant Authority Beyond Advising
the President
The significance of NSC authorities is best understood by its tight-knit immersion in some of the most troubling assertions of government power. The
secrecy behind these pressing social issues affects us all. The NSC exercises an
incredible amount of independent authority in deciding to take the extraordinary action of using lethal force against U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in
kill authorizations such as drone strikes.127 In fact, the NSC’s process in which
U.S. citizens are placed on the “kill list” and executed is conducted entirely
independently of the President.128 It involves a committee of mid-level NSC
officials who draw up targeted American citizens for “kill lists.”129 Their target
recommendations are sent to the panel of NSC “principals,” including Cabinet
secretaries and intelligence unit chiefs, for approval.130
The Director of the CIA has also acknowledged the NSC’s control over the
programs that target American citizens with deadly force without judicial
process.131 The NSC exercises all this significant authority independent of the
President.132 For instance, when Anwar al-Awlaki became the first U.S. citizen
on the “kill list,” President Obama was not required to personally approve the
targeting of an American; rather, one official said Obama would be notified of
the principal’s decision.133 A former NSC official explained that “one of the
127

John Brennan, Answers to Questions for the Record from Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence 5 [“Brennan Responses”] (confirming central role of NSC in the “process of
deciding
to
take
such
an
extraordinary
action”),
www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/posthearing.pdf. On May 22, 2013, Attorney General
Eric Holder sent a letter to Congress acknowledging the United States had “specifically
targeted and killed U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi,” and that it has killed three others, although not specifically targeted, namely, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, Jude Kenan Mohammed,
and Samir Khan. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf.
128 Mark Hosenball, Secret Panel Can Put Americans on “Kill List”, REUTERS (Oct. 5,
2011, 7:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-cia-killlistidUSTRE79475C20111005.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131 Questions from Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, to John Brennan, at
5
(Apr.
30,
2012)
[hereinafter
Brennan
Responses],
available
at
www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/posthearing.pdf (confirming central role of NSC in the
“process of deciding to take such an extraordinary act”).
132 Mark Hosenball, supra note 128.
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reasons for making senior officials principally responsible for nominating
Americans for the target list was to ‘protect’ the President.”134 The magnitude
of NSC power in systematically killing American citizens is the precise independent authority of the President135 that qualifies the NSC as an agency and
therefore subject to the FOIA. “Even if, as the press has stated, the President
ultimately approves lists of individuals ‘nominated’ for drone killing, there can
be no more significant authority than the NSC compiling the list, culling
names, and deciding who will and who will not be included.”136
In addition, the NSC approved and is responsible for the extremely aggressive interrogation methods used after 9/11.137 After the capture of senior AlQa’ida operative Abu Zubaydah in the spring of 2002, attorneys from the
CIA’s Office of General Counsel began discussions with the NSC’s Legal Advisor and OLC concerning the CIA’s proposed interrogation plan for Abu Zubaydah and any legal restrictions on interrogation.138 It was NSC officials who
approved the interrogation program, which utilized extremely aggressive
measures.139 With NSC approval, the CIA employed an alternative interrogation program, including waterboarding on Zubaydah and other detainees between 2002 and 2003.140 In the spring of 2003, the same interrogation policies
and practices were again called into question.141 According to CIA records,
NSC officials met to discuss the interrogation techniques and reaffirmed that
the CIA program was lawful.142
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John Brennan, Answers to Questions for the Record from Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence 5 [“Brennan Responses”] (confirming central role of NSC in the “process of
deciding
to
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an
extraordinary
act”),
www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/posthearing.pdf.
136 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 12, Main St. Legal Servs.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013).
See Neal Conan, How the President Decides to Make Drone Strikes, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(June 6, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/06/154443665/how-the-presidentdecides-to-make-drone-strikes.
137 Kimberly Dozier, WH Adviser: Interrogation Team Questions Shahzad, NBC NEWS
(May 31, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37225759#.UoFMN6U2kpE.
138 Letter from Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Sen John D. Rockefeller IV (Apr. 17,
2009), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/olcopinion.pdf. The CIA determined that Abu Zubaydah had information regarding future Al-Qa’ida attacks against the
US. The CIA believed Zubaydah was withholding imminent threat information at the time
of the initial interrogation and concluded that alternative interrogation methods, including
waterboarding, were appropriate.
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In August 2009, the Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies, building on suggestions by the Intelligence Science Board,143 proposed the
establishment of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group to “bring together officials from law enforcement, the U.S. Intelligence Community and
the Department of Defense to conduct interrogations in a manner that will
strengthen national security consistent with the Rule of Law.”144 Despite failures in maintaining lawful techniques in intelligence interrogations, the NSC
was in charge of policy guidance and oversight of the High-Value Detainee
Interrogation Group.145 In light of the NSC’s ever-increasing legal authorities
beyond advising the President, the NSC exercises the independent authority to
qualify as an agency under the FOIA.

	
  

	
  

C. Through Executive Orders, Publicly-Available Directives, and Regulations,
the NSC Exercises Significant Authority Independent of the President
The President of the United States has, since the Armstrong decision, issued
several executive orders and directives that have fundamentally altered the
NSC staff, authorities, and jurisdiction.146 In fact, through executive orders, the
President has delegated to the NCS/NSS significant independent authority,
which in the aggregate, qualifies the NSC as an agency for purposes of the
FOIA. President Clinton issued an executive order in 1993 that illustrates how
the NSC is fundamentally altered, changing its power, jurisdiction, and capabilities. President Clinton, through executive order, delegated to the NSC
overall policy direction for the newly established National Industrial Security
Program, designed to safeguard classified information.147 In the Executive Order, “Structural Reforms To Improve the Security of Classified Networks and
the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information,” Presi-
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See INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE BOARD, FAS, http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/isb/ (stating that
the Intelligence Science Board was chartered in August 2002 and that it advises the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and senior intelligence community leaders on
emerging scientific and technical issues of special importance to the Intelligence Community).
144 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Special Task Force on
Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24,
2009) (on file with author).
145
Id.
146 Exec. Order No. 12,829 58 C.F.R.. 3,479 (Jan. 6, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,587, 76
C.F.R. 63, 811 (Oct. 7, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13, 603, 77 C.F.R. 16,651 (Mar. 16, 2012);
Exec. Order No. 13, 618, 77 C.F.R. 40, 779 (July 6, 2012); Exec. Order No. 13, 470, 73
C.F.R. 45, 325 (Jul 30, 2008)
147 Exec. Order No. 12,829 58 C.F.R. 3,479 (Jan. 6, 1993) (stipulating that the Program
shall, “in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate subject to the approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of this order, which shall be binding on the agencies.”).
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dent Obama established a Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee.148 The President delegated overall responsibility for the implementation of policies and standards for safeguarding classified information
on computer networks and provided that any “policy or compliance issues”
that the Steering Committee could not resolve be referred to the Deputies
Committee of the NSC.149
In February 2009, the President, through Presidential Policy Directive – 1,
Organization of the National Security Council System, organized the NSC and
delegated to the NSC/NSS significant independent authority.150 The President
ordered the NSC Principals Committee (“NSC/PC”), which the National Security Advisor rather than the President chairs, to continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.151
The President ordered the NSC Deputies Committee (“NSC/DC”) to review
and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process, to ensure that issues
brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.152 The President also delegated responsibility for day-today crisis management to the NSC/DC.153 In addition, the President delegated
responsibility to the NSC Interagency Policy Committees (“NSC/IPCs”) to
achieve development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies.154 The President also assigns the NSC/IPCs to be the main dayto-day responsible entity for interagency coordination of national security policy.155 The President further ordered the NSC/IPCs to be established at the direction of the Deputies Committee and chaired by the NSC.156 At the NSC’s
discretion, the NSC may add co-chairs to any NSC/IPC if desirable.157
In a July 2008 Executive Order, entitled “Further Amendments to Executive
Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,” the President updated the
Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community and United States
Intelligence Activities.158 In doing so, the President assigned to the NSC responsibility to consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation,
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Exec. Order No. 13,587, 76 C.F.R. 63,811 (Oct. 7, 2011).
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150 Memorandum from President Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive – 1: Organization of the National Security Council System (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf.
151 Id. The President states that the NSC/PV shall meet at the call of the National Security Advisor, who determines the agenda and shall ensure that necessary papers are prepared
and decisions are made in a timely manner.
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including all dissents, on each proposed covert action and conduct a periodic
review of ongoing covert action activities, including an evaluation of the effectiveness and consistency with current national policy of such activities and
their consistency with applicable legal requirements.159 The President further
ordered the NSC to review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.160 In an Executive Order entitled “National Defense Resources Preparedness,” the President delegated the NSC to serve as the integrated policymaking forum for consideration and formulation of national defense resource preparedness policy.161 In the Executive Order entitled “Assignment of National
Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions,” the President assigned to the NSC policy coordination, guidance, dispute resolution and
periodic in-progress reviews for security and emergency preparedness communications.162
The NSC and the OST are responsible for the promulgation of telecommunications regulations concerning national security preparedness activities.163
The regulations afford to the NSC responsibility to resolve issues involving the
misuse of federal government activities brought to the attention of communication carriers.164 The regulations also provide that the NSC has oversight and
final decision-making responsibilities for certain government and public telecommunications systems.165 The NSC also has responsibility to approve certain communication requests during national emergencies.166 All assignments,
denials and changes of restoration priorities and sub-priorities are subject to
review and modification by the NSC.167 Based upon the publicly available
delegations of power to the NCS/NSS, the government’s argument that the
function of the NSC is purely advisory is unsustainable.
Publicly available delegations of power clearly indicate the NSC has more
on its plate than a purely advisory role to the President. Most likely, however,
there are other non-public functions and authorities relevant to the NSC. This
gets back to the issue of where the burden of proof should fall in whether an
entity is an “agency” as that term is defined under the FOIA. It is reasonable,
in cases where a government entity asserts that it does not constitute an agency
under FOIA, to require the government entity to prove that its role is purely
advisory and that it does not exercise any independent authority.
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D. Congress Delegates to the NSC Significant Independent Authority Beyond
Advising the President

	
  

Congress has expressly authorized the NSC to take on functions that are
well beyond purely advising the President. Congress has authorized the NSC to
engage in additional activities,168 including assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the U.S. in relation to its actual and potential
military power, in the interest of national security, and to consider policies on
matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the government
concerned with national security.169 Congress has established within the NSC
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.170 Not only is the President not a
member of this Committee, 171 but the Committee was created over the express
objection of the President.172 The Committee is further tasked with conducting
annual reviews of U.S. national security interests.173 Furthermore, Congress
established within the NSC the Committee on Transnational Threats, and, like
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, the President is not a member.174 This
Committee is tasked with the wide-ranging mandate to coordinate and direct
the activities of the United States Government relating to combating transnational threats.175 The Committee is further tasked with developing strategies
and policies and procedures to ensure the effective sharing of information
about transnational threats among federal agencies.176 Additional independent
authority present within the NSC is the Board for Low Intensity Conflict,

	
  
168 50 U.S.C.A § 3021(b) (West 2013) (“In addition to performing such other functions
as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and
functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to national security, it
shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council.”)
169 50 U.S.C.A. § 3021(b)(1)-(2) (West 2013).
170 50 U.S.C.A. § 3021(h)(1) (West 2013) ((“There is established within the National
Security Council a committee to be known as the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (in this
subsection referred to as the ‘Committee’”.))
171 § 3021(h)(2)(A)-(D) (The Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall
serve as the chairperson of the Committee. Such other members as the President may delegate).
172 Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 2 Pub. Papers 1813 (Oct. 11, 1996).
173 § 3021(h)(4)(A) (“In carrying out its function, the Committee shall—conduct an annual review of the national security interests of the United States.”).
174 §§ 3021(i)(1)-(2) (There is established within the National Security Council a committee to be known as the Committee on Transnational Threats (in this subsection referred
to as the ‘Committee’). The Committee shall include the following members: The Director
of National Intelligence, The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney
General, The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall serve as the
chairperson of the Committee, Such other members as the President may designate).
175 § 3021(i)(3).
176 §§ 3021(i)(3), (4)(A)–(C).

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
tasked with coordinating the policies of the United States for low intensity conflict.177
The government attempts to label the NSC as a small group of cabinet officials purely advising the President. As the immediately preceding paragraph
shows, this is far from the truth. The NSC’s organization consists of hierarchies of Committees engaged in substantive policy and decision-making, grave
in nature. Much of this authority, standing alone, may be sufficient to support a
finding that the NSC exercises independent authority, but the cumulative effect
of these authorities clearly makes the government’s argument unsustainable.
In light of the numerous assigned authorities from the President and Congress,
the NSC is charged with the broad and non-advisory functions and authorities
to constitute an agency.

	
  

	
  

VI. REBUTTING THE GOVERNMENT’S CASE
An excerpt from the book, A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus
the People’s Right to Know states that, “[t]he best measure of how dearly government officials protect something from becoming public is how energetically
they defend it.”178 In fact, from 1989 to early 1997 leading up to Armstrong,
government lawyers spent over 35,000 hours litigating and appealing decisions
in the case, costing taxpayers over $4,000,000.179 The government argues that
subjecting the NSC to the FOIA will unconstitutionally intrude upon both the
President and the NSC.180 The government argues further that NSC compliance with FOIA overlaps with the nature of the President’s power as enumerated under Article II of the Constitution.181 Both these arguments, however, are
unfounded and contrary to NSC and FOIA precedent.182 In its 1978 opinion,
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), not only stated that the NSC was an
agency under FOIA, but addressed the concerns of those who believed that
FOIA might unconstitutionally intrude upon the President or the NSC: 183
“[D]ue to that nature of the work of the NSC and its staff it is clear that valid

	
  

	
  
177 § 3021(g) (“The President shall establish within the National Security Council a
board to be known as the ‘Board for Low Intensity Conflict’. The principal function of the
board shall be to coordinate the policies of the United States for low intensity conflict.”).
178 Scott Armstrong, The War over Secrecy: Democracy’s Most Important Low-Intensity
Conflict, in A CULTURE OF SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO
KNOW 158-159 (Athan G. Theoharis ed., 1998).
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180 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim at 12, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL
4494712 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013).
181 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1501.
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exemptions are available for the vast bulk of the material which constitutes
NSC records.”184 In considering whether the NSC could ever have complete
immunity from FOIA, the 1978 OLC thought it undoubtedly could not.185
Moreover, although the government argues that subjecting the NSC to the
FOIA would violate constitutional separations of power, there is no evidence
that such intrusions ever occurred during the time the NSC fell within the ambit of the FOIA.186 In addition, applying the FOIA to the NSC would not present a substantial risk of “improper intrusion into the President’s exercise of
constitutional responsibilities,” since the FOIA already exempts materials classified “in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”187 Further weakening the government’s argument, as Judge Tatel’s dissent pointed out, is the fact
the FOIA has exemptions for national security materials.188 This, coupled with
the FOIA’s inapplicability to certain information produced by members of the
NSC who hold distinct non-NSC positions, as in the Office of the President or
the Vice President, guarantees that NSC compliance with FOIA would not interfere with the President.189
In Armstrong, the court found that the NSC is proximate to the President
simply because the President is a member.190 This argument is conclusory and
presents several problems. As the dissent pointed out, the President is an ex
officio member of other EOP groups, which do comply with the FOIA.191 Further undermining this argument is the availability of the “dual-hat” rationale to
make certain NSC documents available to the public.192 The Supreme Court has
supported the proposition that an individual serving a department of government may wear more than one hat.193 For example, “when an individual serves
in two capacities, as an advisor to the President and as a member of an agency,
that person’s records are not subject to FOIA in the former instance, but are in
the latter.”194 If proximity to the President were the determining factor, virtually
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187 Id. (FOIA Exemption).
188 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“[S]pecifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy…”); Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
189 Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 567.
190 Id. at 560.
191 Id. at 568 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (explaining, in the dissenting opinion, that “[i]n my
view, that conclusion should simply be a starting point for our consideration of the second
Meyer factor; we still must analyze how the President’s membership on the NSC affects that
entity’s functions.”).
192 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1502. FOIA exempts from its coverage materials classified
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. § 552(b)(1)(A).
193 Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
194 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1502-03.
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every person or entity within the EOP would be excluded from the FOIA, contrary to the statute’s expressed inclusion of the EOP in its definition of the term
“agency.”195
In Armstrong, the court stressed that units of the EOP with the sole functions of advising and assisting the President are not agencies.196 Specifically,
units that do not exercise “substantial independent authority” are not agencies
under the FOIA.197 The President does, however, delegate additional responsibilities to Executive Office agencies.198 In this context, the entity performing
the delegated function is no longer principally advising and assisting the President.199 Assisting the President in this capacity is quite attenuated from the type
of aid contemplated by the advise-and-assist exception to FOIA.200 As the dissent in Armstrong warned, by construing the “advise and assist” language in
such broad terms, the court was laying the groundwork for exempting all EOP
units from FOIA merely because the President’s involvement could be traced
to the units; any delegation the President makes can, if read broadly enough, be
interpreted to be for the purpose of assisting him.201 This interpretation is excessively expansive and would, if applied literally, exempt many agencies currently subject to the FOIA.202 Under the current reading, no EOP would be sufficiently independent to constitute an agency.203 Accordingly, the inquiry into
agency status should evaluate whether an entity has the power to act provided
no higher authority disapproves.204
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§ 552(f)(1).
Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Id.
198 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1497.
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201 Id. at 1498.
202 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “Apparently because of the President’s membership on the NSC, the court treats the Meyer
delegation prong in what I believe to be an unrealistic fashion, expecting Armstrong to
demonstrate that NSC activities reflect a sort of independence from the President that neither FOIA nor our cases envision as a requirement for FOIA agencies. Id. at 569. For example, I think the court makes too much turn on whether an entity may act without the consent
of the President. Id. The Court suggests that an entity cannot have ‘substantial non-advisory
authority of its own’ unless it may exercise its authority ‘without the consent of the President’.” Id.
203 Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judge Tatel explained in his
dissent, “I doubt that any President would permit an EOP unit to act against his will or that
other executive agencies would comply with any order from an EOP unit thought not to
reflect either the President’s wishes or his general policies; yet, FOIA clearly specifies that
EOP units can be “agencies” under the statue. Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 569 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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It is troubling that the Armstrong decision forces individuals to show the
NSC exercises significant independent authority in order to constitute an
agency. Traditionally, the burden of proof fell on the plaintiff only to show a
document held by an agency was a “record” as the term is defined pursuant to
the FOIA.205 Because the government has sole access to information to prove
whether an entity is or is not an agency, the burden should be on the government to demonstrate that an entity is not an agency, especially when that entity
has historically been categorized as such. 206 Otherwise, a plaintiff such as
CUNY can only argue that an entity is an agency by inference or by reference
to generally known facts about a unit such as the NSC. Given the inequity of
resources in this contest, it would be extremely difficult for a FOIA litigant to
successfully prove that a unit of the government is an agency when the entity
maintains it is not.207
Finally, the Armstrong court failed to recognize that the stated purpose and
policy of the FOIA makes it clear that documents possessed by the government
should, if at all possible, be made available to the public.208 The congressional
intent behind the passage of the FOIA was to provide clear access for the public to government held information. Congress intended only those documents
that fell within the ambit of the enumerated exemptions articulated in the FOIA
be excluded in whole or part from public scrutiny; all other information was to
be made available.209 In other words, if information in a record falls within an
exempt category, it should not be released; if it does not fall within the ambit
of an exemption, it must be disclosed.210

	
  

	
  

VII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Louis Brandeis claimed, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”211 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Armstrong was a significant setback
for transparency, accountability and, therefore, principles at the heart of democracy. The Armstrong court, in reaching its opinion, stressed that entities of
the EOP lacking substantial independent authority should not be categorized as
agencies as that term is defined in the FOIA.212 Before Armstrong, it was unequivocally accepted that the NSC exercised substantial independent authority
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that mandated it be subject to the FOIA.213 Although Armstrong has been
strongly criticized on several grounds, nevertheless it has remained the law of
the land since 1996. Yet, much has changed in the national security and foreign
policy arena from 1996 to 2001, and from 2001 to present day. As foreign and
national security policy has changed significantly, unsurprisingly, the NSC’s
role has substantially expanded along with it. This vast expansion and transformation of the NSC renders Armstrong’s analysis outdated and necessitates a
new evaluation of the issues resolved by the D.C. Circuit eighteen years ago in
a different time and atmosphere.
The lawsuit filed last year in district court in Brooklyn, N.Y, was over a
FOIA request by Main Street Legal Services seeking information on the
U.S. Government’s use of drone strikes and kill-lists in the war on terror.214
Main Street Legal Services argued that Armstrong was erroneously decided
and the day has come for courts to revisit the question of whether the NSC
should be subject to the FOIA.215 District Court Judge Eric Vitaliano ruled in
August 2013, rejecting the bid to restore access to National Security Council
records under the FOIA.216 In light of the expansive and ever-increasing
authority of the NSC, this reasoning is outdated and erroneous, and
therefore, cannot be relied on.

	
  
213 Id. at 567. The NSC interpreted “agency” under the FOIA to include the NSC. A
month after the 1974 FOIA amendments, the NSC issued proposed FOIA regulations. See
Freedom of Information Fees, 40 Fed. Reg. 3612 (Jan. 23, 1975); Armstrong, 90 F.3d at
567. A month later, the NSC promulgated final FOIA regulations. See Freedom of Information Act Requests for Classified Documents—Processing, Fees, Reports, Applicable Material, Declassification Criteria, Partial, Release, 40 Fed. Reg. 7316 (Feb. 19, 1975) (codified
at 32 C.F.R. § 2101 (2012)); see also Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 567. Thereafter, the NSC ran an
active FOIA program and was a defendant in multiple lawsuits in which the NSC did not
argue that it was categorically exempt from the FOIA. See, e.g., Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 567;
Willens v. Nat’l Sec. Council, 726 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1989).
214 Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL
4494712, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013). By letter dated November 27, 2012, Main Street
Legal Services (Plaintiff) requested access to records relating to the killing and attempted
killing of United States citizens and foreign nationals by drone strikes, and a copy of all
National Security Council meeting minutes taken in the year 2011. Id. In a letter dated December 14, 2012, but postmarked January 18, 2013, the NSC acknowledged receipt of
Plaintiff’s November 27, 2012 letter and stated “[a]s an organization in the Executive Office
of the President that advises and assists the President, the NSC is not subject to the Freedom
of Information Act. Id.
215 Id. at *5.
216 Id. at *6. In his order, Judge Vitaliano explained how he saw no reason to depart from
the 1996 D.C. Circuit ruling that found files beyond the reach of FOIA on the grounds that
the NSC’s primary role is to advise the President: “Current event have changed little, except
perhaps to heighten the American government’s concern over (and awareness of) threats to
national security interest.” Id. In analyzing the NSC’s functions, Judge Vitaliano explained
the Armstrong Court concluded that the NSC’s delegated powers primarily involve advising
and assisting the President on national security matters and that the NSC exercises the same
type of powers today, and, therefore, he found “no reason to depart from Armstrong’s thoroughly persuasive reasoning. Id. at *4-5.
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The lawyers for Main Street Legal Services are pursuing an appeal to the Second Circuit,217 which should recognize the D.C. Circuit’s ruling is outdated. A
split between the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit will prompt the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari on the issue, which the justices passed-up on in 1997.
A conflict on the law in the two circuits on such an important issue—an issue
that goes to the heart of the level of transparency in our democracy—makes the
issue of whether NSC records are subject to the FOIA one that will necessitate
ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court.
The NSC has dramatically expanded its role since Armstrong, specifically
through its involvement in the drone targeting process and inhumane interrogation techniques.218 In addition to reports claiming the NSC’s role has expanded
in recent years,219 there is clear evidence of significant independent authority
delegated to the NSC from the President and Congress. This is what the court
will address in Main Street Legal Services v. National Security Council; based
on the activities of the NSC today, it would not be surprising for the court to
reject the Armstrong rational, thus setting up a potential resolution of the matter in the Supreme Court. In light of the explosion of intelligence activities and
the expansion of NSC powers, which have occurred in the last eighteen years
since Armstrong, complete NSC secrecy and lack of transparency is a critical
issue to us all. Failure to include NSC records under the ambit of FOIA
substantially undermines the Act’s purpose of open government and
transparency, elements essential to a healthy democracy. In this context, it is
time for a reevaluation of the issues previously decided in Armstrong. It is
submitted that an examination of the full range of NSC activities in 2014
unequivocally evidence that the NSC should be characterized as an agency
as the term is defined in the FOIA and that the NSC should once again be
required to respond to FOIA requests for information in its file.
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